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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON NEW MEXICO'S IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION LAW
CYNTHIA REILLY*
Development in medical technology during the 1970s opened doors for
many infertile couples to have children., While one technique, in vitro
fertilization (IVF), provided new opportunities for procreation, it also
evoked images of George Orwell's 19842 society and test-tube babies. In
1985 the New Mexico state legislature amended the human research statute
which limits IVF to infertility treatments and requires implantation of
all resulting embryos. 3 This article analyzes the constitutional problems
posed by this statute and argues that the statute violates the prospective
parents' right to privacy and the physician's procedural due process rights.
I.

IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

Infertility and its treatment are rapidly expanding concerns in American
society and culture. Nearly ten percent of married American couples of
child-bearing age are infertile. 4 The number of couples seeking medical
treatment for infertility has tripled in the last twenty years, from 600,000
5
in 1968 to 1.6 million in 1984, despite an unchanged incident rate. This
increase is largely due to the availability of improved treatment techniques
such as fertility drugs, artificial insemination, and surgery of the reproductive tract. 6 Ten to fifteen percent of infertile couples will require more
sophisticated treatment such as IVF or gamete intrafallopian transfers
fertility medical care in
(GIFT). 7 Approximately $1 billion was spent on
8
1988, $7 million of which was spent on IVF.
In an attempt to achieve pregnancy, in vitro fertilization unites a
woman's ovarian eggs with male sperm outside the body and then places
* Cynthia Reilly is a 1993 graduate of the University of New Mexico School of Law. Currently,
she is serving as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Court of
Appeals, 10th Circuit.
1. Louise Brown, the first child born from in vitro fertilization, was born in 1978 in England.
2. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). Orwell's book describes a "utopian" society in which the
government controlled reproduction through eugenics. See also ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD
(1931), in which reproduction resulted solely from test-tube babies determined to be genetically
desirable.
3. Maternal, Fetal and Infant Experimentation Act, 1979 N.M. Laws ch. 132 §§ 1-7 (codified
as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to -7 (Repl. Pamp. 1991)) [hereinafter "the Act"l.
4. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, INFERTILITY IN AMERICA: WHY IS THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IGNORING A MAJOR HEALTH PROBLEM?, H.R. REP. No. 389, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3

(1989) [hereinafter INFERTILITY IN AMERICA]. Infertility is the failure to conceive after twelve months
of intercourse without contraception. Id.
5. INFERTILITY IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 3.
6. Id.
7. Id. GIFT transfers uncombined sperm and egg to a woman's fallopian tube for fertilization
to occur. Id. This article restricts its analysis to IVF.
8. Id.
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the resulting embryo in the uterus for implantation. 9 Several steps are

involved in this process, beginning with the chemical stimulation of the

ovaries to increase the number of eggs, or oocytes, produced. 10 The
"superovulation" technique provides oocytes for multiple preembryos
from one ovulation cycle, thereby increasing the probability of a resulting
pregnancy from placed preembryos."1
The oocytes are then harvested by a minor surgical technique 12 and
placed in a laboratory dish containing sperm. 3 Fertilization, or the pen-

etration of an oocyte by a single sperm, may take up to twenty-four
hours.

4

The resulting single-cell organism, or zygote, now contains the

pairing of chromosomes necessary to create a unique genetic identity."
The zygote begins to subdivide into a multi-cell, yet undifferentiated,
organism labeled a "preembryo.' 1 6 The preembryos are placed into the
uterus in the four-to-eight-cell stage, usually two to three days after the
harvest of oocytes. 17 The successful embryo develops the ability to interact

with the uterine lining. 18 It embeds itself in the uterine wall after six to

nine days and then pregnancy is achieved. 19
After implantation, the embryos continue to subdivide and develop
into two-cell populations. One population gives rise to the placenta and
the other population produces the fetus. 20 Approximately fourteen days
after fertilization the primitive streak appears, an opaque line which
marks the first development of the central nervous system of the fetus. 2'
After the primitive streak appears, the embryo develops fetal characteristics, such as body parts and organs. 22
9. For an excellent account of in vitro fertilization, see Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in
Reproductive Technology: In Vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Donated
Gametes and Embryos, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 828 (1988); see also Ethics Comm. of Am. Fertility
Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1S
(Supp. 2 1990) [hereinafter Ethical Considerations].
10. Seibel, supra note 9, at 829; see also Andrew L. Speirs et al., Analysis of the Benefits and
Risks of Multiple Embryo Transfer, 39 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 468 (1983).
11. Speirs, supra note 10, at 468; see also BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE
LAW AND ETcs 120 (1991).
12. The techniques for removal of oocytes are laparoscopy or aspiration through a hollow needle.
The harvesting of multiple oocytes reduces the physical risk of these procedures, as well as reducing
the financial and emotional toll on the couple. FuRRow, supra note 11, at 120.
13. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory
Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REv. 633-34 (1991).
14. Seibel, supra note 9, at 829-31.
15. Id.
16. Most legal and medical scholars have settled on the term "preembryo" which refers to "[a]
number of developmental stages before the embryonic stage whose different names (zygote, morula,
blastocyst) are not pertinent to the issues .... " Raymond C. Grandon et al., 264 JAMA 2382
(1990) (reply to letter calling "preembryos" a "ridiculous term"). The term was adopted by the
Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society. Id.; see also Ethical Considerations,supra note
9, at vii.
17. Seibel, supra note 9, at 829-31.
18. Clifford Grobstein, The Early Development of Human Embryos, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 213,
219 (1985).
19. Id.
20. Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human Preembryo, the Progenitors, and the
State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, and Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 257,
263-64 (1990) (citing CLnFORD GROBSTEn, SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN 58-62 (1988)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Il.

THE NEW MEXICO STATUTE

The New Mexico legislature passed the Maternal, Fetal and Infant
Experimentation Act (the Act) in 1979 .23 The Act regulates research
conducted on mothers and babies in New Mexico. The Act contains
definitions 24 and sections which limit research conducted on a pregnant
woman, 25 a fetus, 26 or a live-born infant. 27 Additionally, the Act requires
29
28
precursor animal studies, forbids compensation to a research subject
and requires informed consent from the appropriate party before a pregnant woman, a fetus, or an infant can participate in clinical research.3 0
The Act also precludes the researcher from involvement in decisions
32
3
concerning termination of a pregnancy, ' determinations of fetal viability
and changes in termination protocol solely for research purposes.33 Finally,
the Act imposes criminal penalties on anyone who knowingly and willfully
conducts 3 4research in an unlawful manner on a pregnant woman, infant
or fetus.
In 1985, the legislature amended the definitions section to include
regulation of IVF (the IVF Act).35 In an attempt to classify IVF as
research and yet allow its application in fertility treatment, the legislature
amended the statutory construction clause of the IVF statute to read:
"clinical research" . . . includes research involving human in vitro
fertilization, but shall not include diagnostic testing, treatment, therapy
or related procedures conducted by formal protocols deemed necessary
for the care of the particular patient upon whom such activity is
performed and shall not include human in vitro fertilizationperformed
to treat infertility; provided that this procedureshall include provisions
to insure that each living fertilized ovum, zygote or embryo is implanted in a human female recipient, and no physician may stipulate
the pregnancy should produce
that a woman must abort in the event
36
a deformed or handicapped child.
The implantation requirement 3" in the amendment creates two difficulties. First, it invites troublesome medical problems despite its presum-

23. 1979 N.M. Laws ch. 132 §§ 1-7 (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to
-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1991)).
24. Id. § 24-9A-1.
25. Id. § 24-9A-2.
26. Id. § 24-9A-3.
27. Id. § 24-9A-4.
28. Id. § 24-9A-5(A)(1).
29. Id. § 24-9A-5(B).
30. Id. § 24-9A-5(C).
31. Id. § 24-9A-5(A)(2)(a).
32. Id. § 24-9A-5(A)(2)(b).
33. Id. § 24-9A-5(A)(3).
34. Id. § 24-9A-6.
35. 1985 N.M. Laws, ch. 98 (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-l(D) (Repl.
Pamp. 1991). The remainder of the Act was unchanged.
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-I(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (emphasis shows added language). The
remainder of this article's citations to the Act refer to the Act as amended in 1985.
37. "[P]rovided that this procedure shall include provisions to insure that each living fertilized
ovum, zygote or embryo is implanted in a human female recipient." Id.
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able statutory goal of maternal and fetal protection. The requirement
makes no allowance for medical protocol designed to insure the health
of the mother or fetus that might discourage a physician from implanting
every preembryo.3 8 The substantive requirement of complete implantation
thus may increase risks to mothers and babies instead of fulfilling the
apparent and laudatory legislative goal of protecting these patients. Interestingly, the medical solution to at least one of these risks, multiple
gestations, would require the mother and her physician to abort some
or all of the fetuses after the preembryos are implanted. 9 This solution
presents no legal liability for either mother or physician, whereas the
decision to reduce medical risk by implantation of fewer than all embryos
may give rise to liability. 40
The second difficulty created by the implantation requirement is that
the legislation contains substantial constitutional infirmities. The implantation requirement infringes on procreative rights of IVF participants
without identifying an interest the state seeks to protect. 4 ' Further, it is
unclear how the legislature intended the courts to enforce the IVF clause.
The section applying possible criminal penalties to IVF physicians raises
the issues of vagueness and notice required by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 42
Due to these difficulties, the legislature should repeal the 1985 amendment to the Act. If the legislature desires to regulate emerging reproductive
technologies, it must do so in a manner that neither increases medical
risk nor offends the United States Constitution.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The New Mexico IVF statute gives rise to two constitutional problems.
Because the Act mandates implantation of all preembryos, it impermissibly
infringes on an IVF participant's substantive due process right to privacy
in making reproductive decisions. Additionally, the Act's lack of adequate
notice of civil and criminal liability for physicians and IVF participants
who choose less than total implantation may violate these parties' procedural due process rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit considered fatal similar constitutional infirmities in a
comparable Illinois statute. 41 If challenged, the New Mexico statute faces
a similar fate.
A.

The Right to Privacy
The United States Constitution does not specifically enumerate a right
to privacy. The United States Supreme Court, however, has found that

38. Speirs, supra note 10.
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
41. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-I(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1991); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See
infra notes 102-35 and accompanying text.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See infra notes 136-74 and accompanying text.
43. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 787 (1991).
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a right to privacy exists within the liberty interests protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Generally characterized
as "substantive due process rights," the right to privacy concept "refers
to the principle that a law adversely affecting an individual's life, liberty
or property is invalid, even though offending no specific constitutional
'45
prohibition, unless the law serves a legitimate governmental objective."
The personal liberty to choose a profession, become educated, marry and
raise a family, among others, are included within the broad definition
of the right to privacy."
The Court has developed a two-step process to determine whether a
law infringes upon the right to privacy.4 7 First, a court must determine
the character of the right upon which the law infringes.4 8 If the right is
fundamental, a court will apply a strict scrutiny standard and require
the state to show a compelling interest in the regulation. 49 If the right
is characterized as less than fundamental, the state need only show a
rational basis for its legislation.5 °
Legal ethicists have applied this analysis to regulation of IVF for over
thirteen years. 5 There is general agreement that IVF involves a fundamental right to privacy and, therefore, state regulation must be narrowly
tailored to avoid unwarranted infringement on that right.5 2 Because the
Act mandates implantation of each preembryo produced through IVF,
it is unlikely that the New Mexico statute would pass a constitutional
challenge based on a woman's right to procreative privacy.
Ethicists reach the conclusion that IVF triggers substantive due process
rights because of two important policy issues that transcend this twopronged analysis. The first issue is the determination of who has decisionmaking rights under the Act. An analysis of decision-making rights will
help determine the characterization of the right as fundamental or as
simply a liberty interest. The second issue involves the legal status of
the preembryo, which will control the nature of the state's interest. The
Act raises these issues in its implantation requirement by impliedly vesting
decision-making authority in the state without describing the interest the

44. "No state shall .. . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function
of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 733 (1976).
46. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
47. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540-42 (1942).
48. See id.
49. Id. at 541. Strict constitutional scrutiny requires the state to show that the limitation on a
fundamental right is both necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
50. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
51. See DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS: HEW SUPPORT
OF HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER: REPORT OF THE ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD,

44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,048 (1979) [hereinafter HEW REPORT].
52. See, e.g., id.; see also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Privacy and The Regulation of the Technologies: A Decision-Making Approach, 22 FAM. L.Q. 173 (1988); Ethical Considerations, supra
note 9, at 2S; Eggen, supra note 13, at 644; Martin, supra note 20, at 279.
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state seeks to protect. By leaving these issues unresolved in the Act, the
New Mexico legislature provided little guidance to the courts.
1. The Nature of the Right
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized reproductive
freedom as a fundamental right. The Court first addressed this right in
Skinner v. Oklahoma," where a mandatory sterilization law for habitual
criminals was struck down. The Court characterized the right to procreate
as among "the basic rights of man." '5 4 Beginning with Griswold v.
Connecticut," later cases included the right to reproductive freedom within
a "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. "56 In Eisenstadt v. Baird," the Court extended procreative choice
within the right to privacy to unmarried individuals. Justice Brennan
declared: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." '
This precedent established by the Supreme Court suggests that the New
Mexico IVF Act infringes on a fundamental right. The right to privacy
in procreative decisions constitutionally protects a person's decision whether
to become a parent. The Act, however, requires an IVF patient to proceed
with implantation as soon as the process produces a preembryo. The
implantation requirement thus shifts the locus of decision-making control
from the parents to the state, thereby infringing on the patient's right
to be free from the infringement upon procreative choice prohibited in
Eisenstadt. This legislative intrusion is unconstitutional unless the state
can show a compelling state interest which the Act protects. 5 9
The conclusion that the Act infringes upon a patient's fundamental
right to procreate is subject to two attacks. First, the United States
Supreme Court may have narrowed its characterization of privacy rights
as fundamental in recent cases. Second, the Court has examined narrowly
whether American society traditionally values the privacy or family interest
at issue in determining whether the privacy right is fundamental in nature.

53. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
54. Id. at 541; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (the right of an individual
"to marry, establish a home and bring up children"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
("The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' . . . 'basic civil
rights of man,' . . . and 'rights far more precious .. . than property rights."').
55. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. Id. at 484.
57. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
58. Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted). The Court also has characterized reproductive rights as
fundamental in the abortion context. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court declared
that fundamental rights are included in the guarantee of personal privacy. Id. at 153. The Court
included activities relating to marriage, family relationships, and child rearing and education among
the protected rights. Id. Recognizing that the right was not explicit in the Constitution, the Roe
court found the locus of the right within the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Id.
59. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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These trends suggest that the Court may not recognize the parents' interest
in freedom from governmental interference in IVF decisions as a fundamental right.
The Court has retreated from its characterization of procreative rights
as fundamental in two cases. A plurality decision, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,60 characterized the right to abortion as merely a "liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. "61 While Planned Parenthood v. Casey62 affirmed the constitutional basis of fundamental privacy
rights under the Due Process Clause,," the Court's reasoning reduces a
woman's right to freedom in abortion choices as compared to other
rights surrounding family relationships. The Court in Casey recognized
that the abortion interest is similar, but not equivalent, to the procreative
interests fundamentally protected in Griswold.6 Because the interest is
less than a fundamental one, the plurality attempted to craft a new
65
intermediate analysis.

Further, the Casey opinion contains strong dissents written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist 66 and Justice Scalia, 67 both of whom are joined by
Justices White and Thomas. The four dissenting justices would overrule
Roe v. Wade's finding of a fundamental right to abortion and apply
the rational basis test to uphold the questionable statute in Casey. s If
a court applied the dissenters' view to regulation of reproductive technology, a rational basis analysis would apply rather than strict scrutiny.
The New Mexico IVF Act would thus have a lesser burden to meet,
although the implantation requirement would most likely render the Act
unconstitutional because it requires a woman to become pregnant.

60. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
61. Id. at 508. The Court recently refrained from classifying the right to refuse medical treatment
as a fundamental right to privacy. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990). The Cruzan court also chose to express the right as a due process clause liberty interest.
Id. at 279 n.7.
62. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
63. Id. at 2807.
64. Id.
65. Justice O'Connor advocates a third level of scrutiny for state infringement in the area of
substantive due process rights. Her paradigm is an intermediate level between strict scrutiny and
rational basis which measures whether the regulation "unduly burdens" a fundamental right. She
first articulated this rationale in Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820, she described "undue burden" as "shorthand
for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is
invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be
calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it." Id. She was unable to assemble a
majority opinion on this point, however, when Justice Blackmun insisted that the Court retain strict
scrutiny of governmental interference in abortion decisions. Id. at 2846.
The New Mexico Act, however, contains an absolute mandate requiring implantation. Under
Justice O'Connor's intermediate scrutiny, the Court would likely find that such an absolute mandate
unduly burdens a person's privacy right because the statute replaces all personal choice with a
statutory mandate of attempted pregnancy and/or parenthood once a couple initiates IVF. Thus
even under a standard which is arguably lower than strict scrutiny the statute is unlikely to pass
constitutional muster.
66. Id. at 2855.
67. Id. at 2873.
68. Id. at 2867, 2874.
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The trend reducing the level of constitutional protection given to the
right to abortion may have limited application to legislation regulating
IVF. The abortion cases arise in a different procreative context than
medical technology regulation; abortion ends a pregnancy, while IVF
attempts to create one. Further, a woman's right to procreative privacy
which is violated by the Act's implantation requirement derives from
pre-Roe precedent which is based upon a Due Process Clause definition
of fundamental right. 69 The New Mexico IVF Act, therefore, still must
survive strict scrutiny.
The second trend which has negative overtones for individual fundamental rights in procreative decision-making is illustrated by two subsequent cases concerning privacy and family issues. In Bowers v.
Hardwick,70 the Court analyzed the right to privacy by upholding a
Georgia statute which criminalized sodomy. The Court concluded that
the privacy right does not protect homosexual activities, despite analogies
to protection of activities conducted in the privacy of one's home. 71
Even more troublesome is the Court's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.72 In Michael H. a man who was the undisputed biological father of
a child born to another man's wife challenged a California statute which
gave paternal rights solely to the woman's husband. 71 In a plurality
opinion which upheld the statute, the Court refused to recognize a nontraditional paternal right in the child's natural father. 74 In his refusal to
find a fundamental right at issue, Justice Scalia implied that only interests
that are traditionally protected by our society would be considered fundamental. 75 Justice Scalia concluded that the United States Constitution
does not76protect a right that can only arise from an adulterous relationship.
Legal and medical ethicists agree that, while the privacy jurisprudence
clearly protects coital reproduction, non-coital reproduction, such as IVF,
may require a jurisprudential leap to gain constitutional protection. 77 A
non-traditional method of having children such as IVF, therefore, may
not be recognized as a fundamental right under a Michael H. analysis.
Society traditionally protects the values surrounding marriage and procreation, however, and those values transcend the specific means of
creating a family. 78 The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society

69. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 534, 541 (1942).
70. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
71. Id. at 196.
72. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). The Court produced a majority opinion, albeit 5-4, in Bowers while
Justice Scalia could only muster a plurality in Michael H. However, the Court's composition changed
dramatically between 1986 and 1989 and is perhaps more conservative today. Both Justices Brennan
and Marshall, dissenters in Bowers, have been replaced with justices who may find Justice Scalia's
reasoning in Michael H. persuasive.
73. Id. at 114.
74. Id. at 125 & n.6.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Ethical Considerations,supra note 9 at 3S-5S; HEW Report, supra note 51, at 35,048.
78. Eggen, supra note 13, at 647.

Winter 19941

IN VITRO FER TILIZA TION IN NEW MEXICO

succinctly stated, "[c]oital reproduction is legally protected not for the
coitus but for what the coitus makes possible: it enables the couple to
unite egg and sperm in order to acquire the possibility of rearing a child
.... -9"A couple's right to control decisions surrounding IVF, including
whether to implant some, none, or all of their preembryos, should have
the same constitutional protection that was afforded procreation before
the advent of helpful medical technology.
A case presenting issues similar to those raised by the New Mexico
IVF statute completely sidesteps the dispute concerning the nature of the
80 a class
protected right. In Lifchez v. Hartigan,
of Illinois endocrinologists
sought declaratory relief in federal district court. The physicians petitioned
the court to strike down an Illinois statute which regulated IVF and
imposed criminal liability for fetal experimentation. The court held that
the statute was unconstitutional, in part because it restricted a woman's
right to make reproductive choices free of governmental interference. 8'
Although the court concentrated on the physician's procedural due process
challenge, it did not hesitate to characterize the woman's right to reproductive choice as fundamental when it briefly addressed the issue.8 2
The court marched through the traditional fundamental right to privacy
cases, beginning at Griswold and quickly arriving at Roe, apparently
ignoring Roe's questionable status. 83 Affirming the Lifchez decision in a
memorandum opinion, the Seventh Circuit was similarly unconcerned
about the strength of the legal precedent upon which the district court
relied. 84 Thus, the highest federal court which has considered the issue
affirmed the grant of fundamental status to an individual's right to
control decisions concerning IVF.
More recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the nature of
the right to procreational autonomy in a dispute concerning IVF and
held the right to be "a vital part of an individual's right to privacy." ' 85
Davis v. Davis began as a divorce action between a couple who struggled
for years to have a child. After several unsuccessful IVF attempts, a
highly productive oocyte harvest allowed them to cryopreserve additional
preembryos for later attempts at fertilization. Three months after the
oocyte harvest, the husband, Junior Davis, filed for divorce. The fate
of the frozen preembryos was the only contested matter in the divorce. 86
The trial court found the preembryos to be "children," awarded custody
to Mary Sue Davis, and ordered that she "be permitted the opportunity

79. Ethical Considerations, supra note 9, at 4S.
80. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 111.), aff 'd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 787 (1991).
81. Id. at 1376.
82. Id. The procedural due process challenge is discussed infra notes 136-175.
83. Id.
84. 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 787 (1991).
85. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
86. Id. at 589.
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to bring these children to term through implantation. 8 7 Junior Davis
appealed the trial court's ruling on the theory that the trial court's order
infringed upon his constitutional right "not to beget a child where no
pregnancy has taken place." 88 The court of appeals agreed and reversed
the trial court's decision. Mary Sue Davis then sought review of the
validity of the appellate court's constitutional rationale.8 9
Tennessee does not have a statute regulating IVF; nor is there local
or national case law on point. Instead, the Tennessee Supreme Court
relies upon the "extensive comment and analysis in the legal journals." 9
The resulting opinion attempts to resolve the legal and ethical dilemmas
in a thoughtful and thorough manner. The opinion concludes that the
myriad of policy, ethical, constitutional and scientific factors are resolvable
only by "weigh[ing] the interests of each party to the dispute" 9' within
the framework of their constitutional rights.
In analyzing what it labeled as "The Right of Procreational Autonomy,"
the court follows the development of the right to privacy in the federal
courts. 92 Additionally, the court notes that the Tennessee Constitution so
firmly establishes the concept of individual liberty that it provides "the
right to resist governmental oppression and interference with liberty ...
even to the extent of overthrowing the government." 93 The court held,
therefore, that "the right of procreation is a vital part of an individual's
right to privacy." 94 Undaunted by the uncertainty created by the Webster
plurality concerning the scope of the right to procreate, the court departs
familiar territory to apply the right to in vitro fertilization. 95
Although the Tennessee Supreme Court avoids the label "fundamental,"
it analyzes the locus of decision-making authority in its attempt to define
the scope of the right to procreate. The unique facts of the Davis case,
a dispute between two persons who jointly created preembryos, causes
the court to focus on the parallel aspects of the right to procreational
autonomy. The court notes that the right "is composed of two rights
of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation." 9 The court realizes that IVF disputes bring both the "equivalence of and inherent tension between these two interests ' 97 to a head.
Refusing to avoid the irreconcilable result, the court views the parties
as entirely equivalent gamete-providers and, thus, sees their interests as
equal. 98 This logic creates a three-dimensional conflict between the hus-

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 598-99; see also supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court distinguishes decision-making authority in the abortion context from that in
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band, the wife, and the state regarding decision-making authority. The
court partially resolves this conflict by holding that "decisional authority
rests in the gamete-providers alone, at least to the extent that their
99
decisions have an impact upon their individual reproductive status."
The Davis decision thus firmly places decision-making authority in the
hands of the gamete-providers and requires the state to show a sufficient
interest before it infringes on the gamete-providers' procreational autonomy. 100 Little doubt exists that the court intended the scope of the right
to decisional authority to be equal to that of other fundamental rights
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Indeed, the court nearly elevated procreational autonomy in this context
to an absolute right when it declared that "no other person or entity
has an interest sufficient to permit interference with the gamete-providers'
decision to continue or terminate the IVF process, because no one else
bears the consequences of these decisions in the way that the gameteproviders do. '"101
Both the federal and the state courts that have addressed the nature
of reproductive rights in the context of IVF agree that the right involved
is one of fundamental dimensions. This conclusion is consistent with the
views of many legal, medical and ethical scholars who have studied the
issue. The characterization of the right to procreative autonomy as fundamental places the New Mexico statute at risk of being struck down
as unconstitutional-unless the state succeeds in presenting a compelling
interest that will outweigh such a fundamental right.
2. The Nature of the State's Interest
The second prong of the constitutional test to determine when state
regulation infringes upon a fundamental right is an analysis of the state's
interest. Even fundamental rights are not absolute and must yield if the
state's interest is sufficiently compelling and the regulation is narrowly
tailored to meet that interest. 10 2 Some commentators have struggled,
however, to imagine a state's interest that could constitutionally trump
°3
a person's right to participate in IVF free of governmental interference.
The usual response to the question concerning a state's interest lies
within the state's police powers, specifically, the state's interest in health
and safety. The argument that this is indeed the interest the state sought

an IVF context. It notes that a woman's interest in bodily integrity, inherent in the abortion analysis,
is not an issue in IVF, despite the emotional stress and physical discomfort of the IVF procedures.
The court focuses on the competing equities involved in the desire to create or avoid parenthood.
Interestingly, the court concludes that avoiding genetic parenthood, the interest Junior Davis sought
to protect, is an interest equivalent to more traditional parenting interests, such as childrearing. Id.
99. Id. at 602.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103. See Martin, supra note 20, at 287 ("[Ilt is hard to conceive of any state interest which
would be sufficiently compelling to override the progenitors' decision-making freedom.").
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to protect in the New Mexico statute is consistent with the overall context
of the Act. The Act purports to protect pregnant women, fetuses and
infants from unregulated experimental research, particularly research not
designed to benefit the individuals. 1°4 The language of the New Mexico
IVF clause further supports this assumption. The Act allows IVF if "each
living fertilized ovum, zygote or embryo is implanted in a human female
recipient .. ."101
". A reasonable construction of the purpose of this phrase
indicates that the state desired to protect the life of the preembryo. In
other words, the state expressed an interest in the life that the preembryo
potentially might have.
Roe, however, requires viability before the state's interest in potential
human life is compelling. 16 In the case of IVF, the state's interest is
reduced further by the fact that the preembryos the statute protects are
not yet implanted. Under a medical definition, therefore, the preembryos
are not yet potential human life. 107 Rather, they are collections of four
to eight undifferentiated cells. 08 The preembryos do not have fetal characteristics, such as organs or a nervous system. 1' 9 They do not develop
fetal characteristics, if they survive at all, until more than two weeks
after successful implantation when the primitive streak appears." 0 New
Mexico is therefore protecting the potentiality of potential human life,
an attenuated position at best, and certainly insufficient to warrant
infringement on a fundamental right.
This protection argument presumes, however, that courts and scholars
agree on the legal status of a preembryo and that the legal status is that
of potential human life. Quite the contrary is true. The debate on the
nature of the preembryo itself continues both in the courts and in legal
and medical journals. It is impossible to characterize the state's interest
without a clear understanding of the subject of the legislation or court
action. Clarity in this area is elusive, however, and is destined to remain
out of reach because of the intersection of science, medicine, moral and
legal thought which occurs at the beginning and ending edges of life."'
Some courts resort to principles of property law when addressing the
legal status of a preembryo. This approach completely rejects the notion

that the preembryo is a potential human life. In York v. Jones," 2 a
dissatisfied couple attempted to transfer a frozen preembryo from an
IVF program in Virginia to one in California. The IVF clinic refused
to release or to ship the preembryo, relying on a "Cryopreservation

104. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-2(l), 24-9A-3, 24-9A-4(A), 24-9A-5(C)(3) (Repl. Pamp.
1991).
105. § 124-9A-1(D).
106. 410 U.S. at 163. Justice O'Connor would replace the Roe trimester analysis with a viability
determination. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
107. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L.
REV. 437, 445 & n.27 (1990).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Martin, supra note 20, at 264.
111. See FURROW, supra note 11, at 35-40.
112. 717 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). York involved a contract dispute between a couple who
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Agreement" between the parties." 3 The couple's complaint created the
framework for the court's implied holding that the preembryo had prop4
erty status. The couple filed an action in detinue and breach of contract."
The Virginia federal district court accepted the parties' characterization
of the preembryos as property subject to a contract. The court determined
that the clinic was a bailee and therefore liable for the return of the
property to the couple." 5 The court rejected the defendant's assertion
that the Virginia Human Research Statute, incorporated into the couple's
agreement, required the clinic to refrain from activity such as interinstitutional transfer of cryopreserved preembryos because it would fall
outside the clinic's approved protocol and thus constitute impermissible
human research." 6 Instead, the court strictly construed the agreement
against the clinic, and held that the clinic must recognize the plaintiffs'
proprietary rights in the preembryo." 7
The court's solution in York leaves many commentators uneasy. The
classification of a preembryo as property fails to recognize the "qualitative
difference between the preembryo and other 'things' recognized as property,"" 18 such as "Cuisinarts, sofas, and other property often contested
in divorce proceedings. '"" 9 Professor Robertson, on the other hand, sees
no other way to fully recognize the locus of decision-making authority
in the IVF participants than to classify the preembryo as property. 120 He
moderates this characterization, however, by saying that "property" does
not equal "property" when it comes to preembryos. Professor Robertson
would limit the bundle of property rights for preembryos to locating
decision-making authority in the providers. 21 Perhaps sensing dissatisfaction with this limitation, Robertson analogizes to parental authority
over children. 122 The usefulness of the analogy stops, however, at the
limit placed on parental authority by consideration of the children's
interests.
An approach at the opposite extreme would classify the preembryo as
a person, entitled to the full panoply of constitutional rights. Louisiana
passed legislation in 1986 that defines an "in vitro fertilized human
ovum"'

123

as a "juridical person,"'124 entitled to sue and be sued and to

froze preembryos at a university hospital but later desired to move outside the area. Id. at 424.
They requested the hospital transfer the preembryos but the hospital, concerned with the efficacy
of a transfer, refused. Id. The hospital moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at 427.
The York court held the couple stated a cause of action based on their property interest in the
preembryos. Id.
113. Id. at 425.
114. Id. at 423.
115. Id.at 425.
116. Id. at 425-26.
117. Id. at 426-27.
118. Martin, supra note 20, at 269.
119. FURROW, supra note 11, at 125.
120. Robertson, supra note 107, at 454-55 & n.48.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West Supp. 1990).
124. Id. § 9:126
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have a curator appointed to protect its rights.2 5 Another section of the
Louisiana statute unequivocally labels a preembryo "a biological human
being.' ' 2 6 This characterization appears to be a minority view because,
due to the holding in Roe, there is little question that a fetus is not a
"person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 7 Nevertheless, the view that a preembryo is a biological human being is consistent
with the mandatory implantation language of the New Mexico IVF Act.
The most recent court to tackle the legal status of the preembryo
concluded that it belongs in neither the human life model nor the property
29
model. 2 Adopting an approach which ethicists have long advocated,
the Davis court characterized the preembryos as "not, strictly speaking,
either 'persons' or 'property." ' 3 0 Instead, the court found preembryos
''occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because
of their potential for human life."''
Advocates of this interim characterization hope that it will allow the
courts to develop the status of the preembryo in terms of specific issues
and concrete facts. 3 2 The Davis court used the middle-level approach to
vest decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos
3
This
in the providers while denying them a "true property interest."'
promotes
that
qualified characterization may allow an expression of values
respect for the preembryo but avoids "bright line principles which do
not seem appropriate at the edge of life.' 3 4 Professor Robertson cautions,
however, that it may "seem like empty rhetoric if it leads to no limits
at all on what may be done with embryos."'
The struggle to legally define the preembryo calls for a legislative
process which addresses the competing theories and provides consensus
and guidance for the courts. Certainly, the current New Mexico solution
fails to fulfill this need. Furthermore, without a clear statement of the
state's interest, the New Mexico IVF Act is doomed under a constitutional
challenge.
ProceduralDue Process
The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute that does
not give sufficient notice to an actor of the legality of his behavior is
unconstitutional. 3 6 The right to procedural due process is explicit in the

B.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2839 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 568 & n.13 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
129. See HEW Report, supra note 51, at 35,056; Ethical Considerations, supra note 9, at 32S33S; Martin, supra note 20, at 276-78; Robertson, supra note 107, at 446-49.
130. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
131. Id.
132. Martin, supra note 20, at 278.
133. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
134. Martin, supra note 20, at 278.
135. Robertson, supra note 107, at 448-49.
136. See Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 (1941).
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Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.'1 7 Vague laws
make it impossible for people to conform their behavior to the law and
increase the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' 3 8 The Court
has said that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled
to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."'' 9 Applied
to the New Mexico IVF Act, the doctrine of procedural due process
suggests that the act may be constitutionally void for vagueness because
it is unclear whether the criminal penalty section applies to a physician
engaged in an IVF treatment program. If the Act's criminal sanctions
apply to an IVF specialist, it is also unclear what the Act requires of
the physician.
1. Criminal Penalties Section
The New Mexico IVF Act contains a penalties section which mandates
imprisonment of up to one year and/or a fine up to $1000 for an
intentional violation of the Act's research provisions concerning pregnant
women, fetuses and infants. 14 This penalty may apply to a physician 4'
treating infertility with IVF even though the penal section does not include
the definitions section that purports to regulate IVF. The IVF specialist
must determine whether the penalty section constrains his activities with
a preembryo and if so, which activities are constrained.
a. Penalty Section and Preembryos
The IVF Act defines "fetus" as the "product of conception from the
time of conception . . . but shall not include cultured cells.' ' 42 Whether
a preembryo falls within this definition is unclear. The Act does not
define conception, nor does it account for technological change in the
concept of conception. A preembryo is the result of the fertilization
process. 14 Arguably, "product of conception" and "fertilization" are
synonymous. Certainly the preembryo is the product of fertilization. Under
this interpretation, preembryos would be included in the fetus section.
On the other hand, an equally persuasive argument is that "time of
conception" is synonymous with "implantation." Only preembryos that
are successfully implanted would thus qualify as fetuses.
An alternate interpretation is that the definition of fetus does not
include preembryos. Preembryos may be considered "cultured cells," and
therefore not subject to the research restrictions. It is well established

137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... 1).
138. See Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306 (1941).
139. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
140. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
141. Presumably any criminal liability would attach only to the physician because the language
of the IVF clause speaks to the physician. A prospective parent also may be liable, however, because
Id. (emphasis added).
the penalty section states "[w~hoever knowingly and wilfully violates ....
142. § 24-9A-I(G) (emphasis added).
143. See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
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that preembryos are no more than collections of undifferentiated cells
when they are implanted. 144 This interpretation seems inconsistent, however, with the Act's requirement of implantation, presumably to prevent
physicians from conducting research on them.
Further, exclusion of preembryos as fetuses creates an inconsistency
within the structure of the Act. The penalty section provides enforcement
for other protected classes identified in the Act. There is no other protected
category in which they logically can belong, i.e., pregnant women and
live born infants. Absent application of the penalty section, the Act fails
to provide an enforcement mechanism for the protection it attempts to
create for preembryos. This result more likely stems from the ad hoc
inclusion of IVF in the Act rather than legislative intent to draft unenforceable legislation. The creation of a newly protected class supports
the conclusion that the legislature intended the existing penalty section
to aid in enforcement.
The only interpretation that seems reliable is that the Act is unclear
whether the fetus section would include preembryos and, therefore, whether
the penalty section applies to activities with preembryos. This confusion
makes it impossible for a fertility specialist to determine whether he must
conform his medical practice to the terms of the Act in order to avoid
criminal penalties. On this basis alone a court can conclude that the Act
violates the physician's due process rights.
b. "Research" and IVF
The Act defines "clinical research" as "any biomedical or behavioral
research involving human subjects, including the unborn, conducted according to a formal procedure,' '1 45 including "research involving human
in vitro fertilization . . . ."'4 The Act somewhat narrows the definition
of clinical research by excluding treatment-related protocols applied to
benefit a particular patient. 47 Coupled with the willful and knowing
requirement of the penalty section and the language of the fetus section
which allows minimally risky research if beneficial to the particular fetus,
the limitations can generally be called therapeutic intent exceptions. 48
These exceptions may exempt a physician from criminal penalties for
research procedures if his intent is to help a patient.
This statutory construction may not yet provide constitutional notice
to a physician, however, because "clinical research" as applied to IVF
remains confusing under the statute. The Act provides little guidance in
part because it is internally inconsistent. For example, the Act treats IVF
activities differently than it treats other clinical research. First, IVF
research is the only area of biomedical or behavioral research specifically
144. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
145. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., § 24-9A-2A(l) (allowing research if "the purpose of the activity is to meet the
health needs of the mother or the fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum
extent necessary to meet such").
148. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-76 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 787 (1991).
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enumerated in the Act. This special status creates curiosity as to legislative
intent that the Act fails to satisfy. Should a court assume that the
legislature intended to create a different standard for IVF research than
other medical research? If yes, then what is that standard?
Second, the Act does not contain a section which explains the meaning
of research in the context of preembryos as it does with the other protected
classes. This omission provides little guidance as to permitted and sanctioned IVF activities. Moreover, the Act removes IVF from the overall
statutory scheme whereby therapeutic intent possibly provides guidance
as to permissible research activities. Does the Act thus imply an absolute
ban on IVF research while allowing therapeutic exceptions in other areas?
Statutory interpretation arguments can be made to import the scope of
therapeutic research allowed in the Act's other sections. Alternatively,
statutory interpretation principles may also dictate an interpretation that
the absence of a parallel section for preembryos indicates legislative intent
to create a different and more limited scope of permissible research for
preembryos by prohibiting it altogether. 49
Third, the Act creates a unique test for non-research IVF activities;
it excludes IVF from its purview if it is "performed to treat infertility"
and the procedure insures that every preembryo will be implanted. Although this language reinstitutes therapeutic use of IVF, it does not create
a therapeutic exception for IVF research. A logical explanation for the
Act's prohibition against IVF research is that the legislature wished to
broadly prevent experimentation on preembryos. This argument depends,
however, on the ability of the legislature, the court, and the physician
to distinguish between treatment and experimentation when addressing
IVF. In addition to the issues raised by the unorthodox implantation
requirement, the Act simply fails to recognize the blurred lines between
research and clinical treatments in medicine-a matter of particular import
in leading edge medicine, for example, IVF protocols.
2. Case Law
The two federal courts that addressed the issue of criminal penalties
struck down state statutes that imposed such penalties on physicians who
performed non-therapeutic research or experimentation on fetuses.150 Both
courts reasoned that the distinctions between these concepts in many
instances cannot be determined. The Lifchez court found this particularly
true in the context of IVF. 5'

149. See NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (4th ed. 1984)
("[AIIl omissions should be understood as exclusions.").
150. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1364-66 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 787 (1991); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 998-99 (5th Cir.
1986) (striking down as impermissibly vague a Louisiana statute imposing criminal penalties for
non-therapeutic experimentation on unborn children and aborted fetuses).
151. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1367-69. Because the Lifchez court specifically addressed these
issues in an IVF context as well as developed them more fully, the discussion is limited to its
opinion.
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In Lifchez, the federal district court construed a section of the Illinois
Abortion Law very similar to the New Mexico Maternal, Fetal and Infant
Experimentation Act in a declaratory judgment action brought by fertility
specialists. The challenged statute provided:
No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the
fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm unless such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus thereby produced. Intentional
violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Nothing in this
subsection (7) is intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro
fertilization."'

Interestingly, two of the uncertainties inherent in the New Mexico Act
are missing from the Illinois statute. The therapeutic exception provides
clarity to the scope of the Illinois prohibition which the New Mexico
act lacks. In addition, the Illinois criminal penalty clearly applied to IVF
experimentation. Nevertheless, the court held the statute unconstitutionally
void for vagueness.'
The Lifchez court began its analysis by describing three ways in which
vague laws violate due process. First, a vague law's inadequate notice
of the precise conduct proscribed renders it "impossible for people to
regulate their conduct within legal bounds." 15 4 Second, vague proscriptions
"invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" by authorities, including judges and juries.' Third, these deficiencies cause people to

"steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked."'15 6 The court concluded that such

intelligence
vagueness violates due process when "persons of common
'57
. . . [must] guess at the meaning of the criminal law."'
The court then applied this due process standard to the Illinois statute.' 58
It accepted Dr. Lifchez's argument that the scientific and medical communities use numerous definitions of "experimentation."1 5 9 One definition
the court considered described experimentation as pure research with the
goal of furthering the researcher's knowledge.' 60 Insurance companies
apply a different definition. They will consider a procedure experimental
and deny coverage if the procedure departs from present-day practice.' 6'
The American Fertility Society considers standard techniques experimental62
when they are performed by a practitioner or clinic for the first time.
Finally, in Margaret S. v. Edwards, the court classified medical therapy
as experimental whenever a practitioner applies what he learns from one

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

81-26, § 6(7) (1989)).
Id. at 1363 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1363.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
Id. (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972)).
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)).
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
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patient to another.163 The Lifchez court found the Margaret S. definition
consistent with the federal guidelines on protection of human research
subjects which define "research" as "a systematic investigation designed
to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge."' The court concluded that this spectrum of definitions for experimentation made it
difficult to align the physicians' activities with the statutory prohibition. 65
Narrowing its focus to IVF, the court noted that the increasing variations
of IVF and related reproductive technologies do not enjoy a statutory
imprimatur.'6 Further, the variations represent uneven advances in IVF
techniques and undoubtedly deserve classification as experimental regardless of what that term means. 167 The court reasoned that the fertility
specialists could attempt to improve their IVF techniques only "at their
peril.' 16 It was concluded that "[t]he fact that many current procedures
fall within the twilight zone between experiment and test, coupled with
a lack of consensus as to how these terms should be defined in the first
place, leaves it hopelessly uncertain as to which procedures are allowed
and which are forbidden." 16 9 Because the statute fails the "common
intelligence" test, the court held it unconstitutionally vague in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 0
Unfortunately, New Mexico law on criminal statutory interpretation
provides little guidance to IVF specialists. New Mexico courts attempt
to interpret statutes in a manner which will not render their application
unreasonable nor defeat the intended objective of the legislature.' 7' What
constitutes reasonable interpretation of a statute which first equates IVF
with research before allowing a treatment exception is difficult to predict
in such an emotionally and politically charged subject as fetal research
and fetal rights. Further, courts have much latitude to divine legislative
intent in New Mexico in the absence of legislative history. In an attempt
to restrict its own power, the New Mexico Supreme Court has said that
it will "read the entire act as a whole, each part construed in connection
with every other part . . ." in order to ascertain legislative intent. 72 The
court could apply this rule to either strike the statute or to uphold it,
depending on whether the criminal penalty section applies to IVF, whether
preembryos are considered fetuses, and whether nascent IVF treatment
advances are considered research.
Following Lifchez, New Mexico will likely apply a "common intelligence" test to a criminal statute to determine whether the statute violates

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. (citing as example, Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1365 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e) (1989)).
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1365.
Id. at 1367.
Id.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1376.
State v. Garcia, 93 N.M. 51, 53, 596 P.2d 264, 266 (1979).
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 76, 703 P.2d 169, 173 (1985).
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procedural due process rights.' This test may not be applicable to the
IVF statute, however, because the court will attempt to consider the
statute's words and phrases in their generally accepted meaning.174 New
Mexico courts find constitutional those statutes containing words that
are easily defined. 75 While "research" and "fetus" have dictionary definitions, those definitions will not be helpful in determining whether
treatment improvements, such as cryopreservation, constitute research on
preembryos. Even if the test is modified to the common intelligence of
a physician, or more specifically, an IVF specialist, the meaning of the
statute's words and phrases do not appear to be reasonably discernable.
Without amendment, therefore, the New Mexico IVF Act remains
vulnerable to constitutional attack. The unusual implantation requirement,
questions concerning the legal status of the preembryo, and the possible
application of the criminal penalty section together lead to one conclusion:
the New Mexico IVF statute is unconstitutional.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Act's definition of research which purports to regulate in vitro
fertilization in New Mexico is unconstitutional in two respects. First, it
violates prospective parents' fundamental right to pursue procreation free
of unnecessary governmental interference. Second, it violates a physician's
due process rights by failing to give adequate notice of prohibited conduct
so that the physician may conform his or her conduct accordingly. The
New Mexico legislature should repeal the research section of the Act
which contains the offending language. If the legislature desires to regulate
reproductive technologies, it should enact legislation which substantively
addresses this area in a manner sufficiently flexible to allow the medical
technologies to evolve without infringing upon constitutional rights. By
so doing, the legislature may accomplish the laudable goal of protecting
the health and welfare of New Mexico women who must use reproductive
technology to become pregnant.

173. State v. Ferris, 80 N.M. 663, 459 P.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1969) (statute violates due process if
its language is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application); see also Bokum Resources Corp. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control
Comm'n, 93 N.M. 546, 603 P.2d 285 (1979).
174. State v. Segotta, 100 N.M. 498, 500, 672 P.2d 1129, 1131 (1983).
175. See State v. Jim, 107 N.M. 779, 783-84, 765 P.2d 195, 199-200 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
107 N.M. 720, 764 P.2d 491 (1988) (applying Webster's dictionary definitions, "protracted impairment" found not constitutionally vague).

